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1. Introduction
In the 1997 paper, KM assume that the economy is populated by In￿nitely Lived
Agents (ILA). In this paper we develop an extended version of the original Kiy-
otaki and Moore￿s model (￿Credit Cycles￿Journal of Political Economy, vol. 105,
no 2, April 1997) (hereafter KM) using an overlapping generation structure in-
stead of the assumption of in￿nitely lived agents adopted by the authors. In each
period the population consists of two classes of heterogeneous interacting agents,
in particular: a ￿nancially constrained young agent (young farmer), a ￿nancially
constrained old agent (old farmer), an unconstrained young agent (young gath-
erer), an unconstrained old agent (old gatherer). By assumption each young agent
is endowed with one unit of labour. Heterogeneity is introduced in the model by
assuming that each class of agents use di⁄erent technologies to produce the same
non durable good. If we study the e⁄ect of a technological shock it is possible to
demonstrate that its e⁄ects are persistent over time in fact the mechanism that
it induces is the reallocation the durable asset (￿land￿ )among agents.
As in KM we develop a dynamic model in which the durable asset is not only
an input for production processes but also collateralizable wealth to secure lenders
from the risk of borrowers￿ default.
12. The environment
In each period there are four classes of agents. In order to simplify matters, we
assume for the moment that there is only one (representative) agent per class.
Therefore in t population consists of
￿ a ￿nancially constrained young agent (young farmer, YF)
￿ a ￿nancially constrained old agent (old farmer, OF)
￿ an unconstrained young agent (young gatherer, YG)
￿ an unconstrained old agent (old gatherer, OG).
A YF borrows from a YG. Being endowed with inalienable human capital, the
former can get from the latter no more than the value of the collateralizable assets,





There are two types of goods, output (￿fruit￿ ) and a non-reproducible asset
(￿land￿ ) whose total supply is ￿xed ( ￿ K). Output is produced by means of a tech-
nology which uses land and labour. By assumption each young agent is endowed
with one unit of labour. Assuming that there is no disutility of labour, this endow-
ment is supplied inelastically. By assumption farmers and gatherers have access




t is output of the farmer in t, ￿ is a positive technological parameter
and KF








￿ ￿ K ￿ KG
t￿1
￿
and G(:) is increasing, concave and satis￿es the
Inada conditions.Both farmers and gatherers work when young and consume when
old.
The paper is organized as follows. OLG-KM economy with money and bequest.
Money is a reserve of value and a way of leaving a bequest. Heterogeneity...
3. The farmer/borrower
For simplicity we assume that the agent does not consume when young. Hence
preferences are de￿ned over consumption and bequest of the agent when old.
Adopting a Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of the utility function, preferences of the
farmer are represented by
U
F = ￿ lnc
F
t;t+1 + (1 ￿ ￿)lna
F
t+1 (1)where 0 < ￿ < 1;cF
t;t+1 is consumption of the agent of generation t in t+1, aF
t+1
is bequest left by agent of generation t in t+1 to his child. 1
The farmer maximizes utility subject to three constraints: the ￿ ow-of-funds
(FF) constraint of the YF, the FF constraint of the OF and the ￿nancing con-
straint (see appendix A for the derivation).






















are real money balances
of the YF; bt is credit and aF
t is bequest, i.e. "wealth" inherited by the YF.
According to 2, the "resources" of the YF, of internal or external origin (aF
t and






￿i.e. to change the
landholding ￿and hold money balances.











is the real price of land in the future, known in advance, and
R is the real (gross) interest rate.
In t, the YF uses labour and land KF
t to produce output which will become
available in t+1: yF
t+1 = ￿KF
t :When old, the farmer￿ s resources consist of output
(produced when young) and money balances.These resources can be employed
to repay the loan (if the YF were a borrower), consume and leave a bequest.















are real money balances
of the OF of generation t in t+1.
1In the case of bequest, the notation is unambiguous. The bequest left by the agent of
generation t in t+1 (i.e. when old) to his child can be denoted by aF
t;t+1: The bequest received
by agent of generation t+1 in t+1 (i.e. when young) is aF
t+1;t+1: Of course the two notions




2Following KM, we purposedly adopt a notation reminiscent of Tobin￿ s q.The farmer maximizes 1 subject to 2 4 and 3. The Lagrangian is:
L = ￿ lnc
F
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From (iF) and (iiF) follows that ￿
F
t+1 6= 0. Therefore the FF constraint of the
OF is binding.











where ￿t := qt ￿
qt+1
R
is the downpayment, i.e. the amount of internal ￿nance the
borrower has to accumulate in order to get a loan equal to
qt+1
R
(per unit of land
he wants to purchase). The downpayment is always positive.
We assume that
(A1) qt+1 6= ￿. In this case, from 5 follows that ￿
F
t 6= 0. Therefore the FF
constraint of the YF is also binding.



















The farmer is the borrower. Therefore the gatherer is the lender.
Thanks to assumptions (A1) and (A2) all the constraints are binding. Substi-



















Equation 7 provides a di⁄erent interpretation of the FF constraint of the young:
the YF employs bequests and collateralizable wealth qtKF
t￿1 to put aside internal
￿nance and hold money balances.
From (iF) and (iiF) and the FF constraint 8 we derive the optimal consump-























Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of prefences, consumption and bequest




















Notice now that from 10 follows that the optimal bequest of the OF of generation
t-1 in t is
a
F













are real money balances of the OF of generation t-1 in t.




[(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿qt]KF




(12)which is the law of motion of the land of the farmer.
Money plays two di⁄erent and contrasting roles with respect to landholding.On
the one hand, given the bequest, the higher money of the young mF
t;t, the lower
landholding: In fact resources of the young (bequest and credit) can be devoted
either to money or landholding; On the other hand, the higher money of the old
mF
t￿1;t, the higher resources available to him and the higher bequest and landhold-
ing.




the old farmer is exchanging money only with the young farmer (more on this in
section...), (1 ￿ ￿)mF
t￿1;t ￿mF
t;t = (1 ￿ ￿)mF
t ￿mF
t = ￿￿mF
t :The second e⁄ect is
o⁄set by the ￿rst so that in the end the accumulation of money a⁄ects negatively
land holding. Hence, recalling that ￿t = qt ￿
qt+1
R












Following the same modelling route of the previous section, we assume that pref-
erences of the gatherer are represented as follows
U
G = ￿ lnc
G





t+1 are consumption and bequest of the OG.Being uncon-
strained from the ￿nancial point of view, the gatherer maximizes utility subject to
the FF constraints of the YG and of the OG (see appendix A for the derivation).
The FF constraint of the YG in t is
m
G











According to 15, the resources of the YG, of internal origin (aG







;i.e. to change the landholding, extend credit and
hold money balances.
In t, the YG uses labour and land KG
t to produce output which will become






:When old, the gatherer￿ s resources consist
of output (produced when young), the reimbursement of debt and money bal-











+ Rbt + m
G
t;t+1 (16)
The gatherer maximizes 14 subject to 15 16. The Lagrangian is:
L = ￿ lnc
G



















































































From the FOCS it is clear that all the constraints are binding. Moreover, from






:Since the total amount of "land" is ￿xed
by assumption, KF
t = ￿ K ￿ KG




= G0 ￿ ￿ K ￿ KF
t
￿
: In nthe following, in








;g0 = ￿G00 >









Since the ￿nancing constraint is binding, the amount of credit extended by the




t : Taking into
account 6, from 16, (iG) and (iiG) we derive the optimal consumption and the



































Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of prefences, consumption and bequest















t;t+15. Playing with constraints
Since the total amount of "land" is ￿xed by assumption, KF
t = ￿ K￿KG
t : Hence an
increase of landholding for the farmer can occur only if there is a corresponding









this fact into account, summing side by side the (binding) FF constraints of the





































In words: the total amount of bequest obtained by the young agents is equal to the
total amount of money of the young agents. In the special case in which bequest




t ; investment of























































In words: aggregate output and real money balances of the old agents is equal to
the sum of aggregate consumption and aggregate bequest.



















t+1 (24)i.e. the total amount of bequest left by the old agents is equal to the total amount










i.e the total amount of money of the young agents in t+1 must be equal to the
total amount of money of the old agents of generation t in t+1.
6. Money trickles down
In our economy money "trickles down" from one period to the next and from one
agent to the other. In fact a network of money transfers is taking place from the
pool of monetary resources of one agent to the pool of another agent. In principle
we distinguish three types of transfers:
￿ "within generations" or horizontal transfers, i.e. transfers between agents of
the same generation but of di⁄erent types (farmers and gatherers). Horizon-
tal transfers are the monetary counterpart of transactions between agents
of di⁄erent types concerning goods (fruit) or land. Therefore they are moti-
vated by agents￿decisions to consume and invest, i.e. modify landholdings;
￿ "between generations" or vertical transfers, i.e. transfers between agents of
di⁄erent generations but of the same type (old and young agents).Vertical
transfers coincides with bequests, which are motivated by intergenerational
altruism.
￿ Government transfers, i.e. monetized subsidies to the old.
In order to describe the way in which money spreads in the economy, let￿ s take
a look at table 1. In each row we report the in￿ ows and out￿ ows which show up
in the FF constraints of the agents in period t+1. The amount in the in￿ ow cell is
equal to the amount in the out￿ ow cell. For instance, the ￿rst row represents the








t+1;t+1 ￿ bt+1.3 In
other words, we have rewritten in a suitable form equation 2. The third row is the
sum of rows 1 and 2 (i.e. of the young agents), the sixth row is the sum of rows
3Matter of factly bt+1 represent an in￿ ow for the YF in t+1. It shows up as a negative
component in the out￿ ow cell for convenience.4 and 5 (i.e. of the old agents). Therefore, the table contains adapted equations
2 15 21 4 16 22.











































Let￿ s assume that yF
t+1 ￿ cF
t;t+1 = sF
t;t+1 > 0; i.e. the OF consumes less than
the output he has produced. In a sense he is "saving" the amount sF
t;t+1: Market




















The OF sells sF
t;t+1 units of output to the OG in order to let him consume in
excess of his output. The OG pays this output by means of money. Therefore,








This money is used to reimburse debt btR and leave the bequest aF
t+1: Accounts are









which is the FF of the OF.
The YF receives aF
t+1 from his parents and bt+1 from the YG and employs these






. The di⁄erence between bequest and
credit on the one hand and investment on the other consists of money balances
mF
t+1;t+1 = aF






that the farmer holds idle when young
(since he does not consume) in order employ them when old to access consumption
and leave a bequest. Notice that, since aF









t+1;t+1 = [(1 ￿ ￿)￿ + ￿qt+1]K
F





This equation links the money of the young farmer to the money of the old farmer
in period t+1. It is 12 rewritten and updated. In ￿gure 1 we represent the
horizontal and vertical transfers taking places among private agents.
where mOG stands for money of the OGand therefore coincides with mG
t;t+1:Analogously
mOF = mF
t;t+1;mY G = mG
t+1;t+1;mY F = mF

















: Both excess consumption of the OG cOG ￿ yG and
investment of the YF i0 are positive by assumption.
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of the utility function,from the








t+1 i = F;G (26)
















Total real money balances are proportional to aggregate output. Equation 27 is
a sort of quantity theory of money in this context.



















:In principle there is no reason to assume that the money the young agent
has must be equal to the money of the old agent of the same class. This equality
holds in the aggregate (see equation 25) but not for each class of agent. We assume















































































7. A simple welfare criterion








therefore represents the same preferences. In order to compute indierct utility
we plug opimal consumption and bequests into the function, obtaining UF =
￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ eF
t+1 i.e. indirect utility is increasing linearly with resources eF
t+1 of
the old farmer where eF
t+1 = (￿ ￿ qt+1)KF
t + mF
t;t+1:
Following the same reasoning, we can draw the conclusion that UG = ￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ eG
t+1
i.e. indirect utility is increasing linearly with resources eG






















￿i.e. society￿ s well being is increasing with the sum of resources of the farmer and
the gatherer.












t = Rbt , i.e. debt service, is a positive component of the gatherer￿ s re-
sources and a negative component of the farmer￿ s resources. It cancels out in the
aggregate.








































i.e. society￿ s well being is increasing with aggregate output.
Maximization of society￿ s welfare therefore occurs when the marginal produc-









t = G0￿1 (￿) = ￿ K ￿ KF
t : Hence KF


















is the maximum aggregate output society can obtain.
The same conclusion in KM.
Notice that from equation... follows that the only level of qt such that the ￿rst




which we have ruled out (see assumption A2 above) because it would imply that
the ￿nancing constraint is not binding. In other words, the ￿rst best could be
attained only if the ￿nancing constraint were not binding. From the FF constraints
it turns out that in the steady state b = aF￿mFand aF = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
yF
f ￿ Rb + mF￿
. Finally, from the quantity theory mF =
1 ￿ ￿
￿ (1 + ￿)











The dynamics of the macroeconomy are described by equation 13, i.e the law of
motion of the farmer￿ s land, equation 17, which links the asset price to the farmer￿ s
land, and equation 29, i.e. the quantity theory of money. The state variables are
KF
t ;qt and mF
t :We list the equations below for the reader￿ s convenience.
KF
t =




















￿ ￿ K ￿ KF
t￿1
￿￿









































































which is a non linear second order di⁄erence equation in the state variable KF
t in
implicit form.
8.1. A convenient special case: linear technology
In order to try and solve the model we have to specify the functional form of
the gatherer￿ s production function. Since the beginning (see section 2) we have
assumed that G(:) is well behaved, i.e increasing and concave. As a preliminarystep in the analysis, however, it is worth exploring the properties of the simplest
case, i.e. of a linear technology:
G









; ￿ > 0





= G0 ￿ ￿ K ￿ KF
t
￿




















In this particular scenario, therefore, the price of land and the downpayment are
given and constant: In a sense we are switching o⁄the interaction between changes
in landholding and the dynamics of the asset price, a crucial feature of the present
and of the original KM model. This property, however, simpli￿es the analysis to
the greatest extent.





t￿1 ￿ ￿1 (32)
where
￿0 = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + ￿


















The law of motion 32 is a ￿rst order linear di⁄erence equation. Let￿ s assume
A3 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿￿ + ￿
1 + ￿
+ ￿qs > ￿s
Since KF
t￿1 ￿ 0; KF
t ￿ 0;the phase diagram of the di⁄erence equation is
KF











￿ K + ￿1
￿0
KF
t = ￿ K for
￿ K + ￿1
￿0
￿ KF




(1 ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ K
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿ + ￿) + ￿qs (1 + ￿)
￿ K + ￿1
￿0
=
[￿s (1 + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿] ￿ K
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿ + ￿) + ￿qs (1 + ￿)
The phase diagram is piecewise linear. The ￿rst segment is a portion of the x-
axis. The second segment is an upward sloping straight line with negative intercept
and slope greater than one. The third segment is a portion of the straight line of
equation KF
t = ￿ K (see ￿gure...).
The steady state is
K
F








￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
qs (1 + ￿)
In words, the steady state value of farmer￿ s land is a portion ￿ of total land which
is decreasing with ￿: Since the slope of the phase diagram at the intersection point
is greater than one, the steady state is unstable.









s + ￿ ￿ K
￿
= m(￿)
The real money balances are a function of ￿. A su¢ cient condition for the
steady state real money balances to be decreasing with ￿ is ￿ > ￿:
In order to assess the e⁄ects of a nominal shock, let￿ s assume that the ratio of
the gatherer￿ s to the farmer￿ s money is given, say ￿0. This means that the rates of
change of the farmer￿ s and of the gatherer￿ s money are the same: ￿G
0 = ￿F
0 = ￿0:
Hence the in￿ ation rate is ￿0 = ￿0:Let￿ s assume, moreover, that, by chance, the
initial condition is the steady state KF
0 = ￿ K￿ (￿0) so that mF
0 = m(￿0):
Let￿ s assume now that the central bank increases the rate of change of money
of the farmer and of the gatherer in the same proportion ￿G
1 = ￿F
1 = ￿1 > ￿0: The
ratio ￿0 does not change. Also KF
0 and mF
0 do not change. The e⁄ect of such a







but the nominal interest rate goes up in the
same proportion as the in￿ ation rate.Suppose now that the central bank adopts a di⁄erentiated policy move. For
instance the rate of growth of money of the gatherer becomes ￿G
1 > ￿0 while the
rate of growth of money of the farmer remains unchanged ￿F
0 = ￿0: The ratio
goes up to ￿1 and stays there even if the rate of growth of money of the gatherer
goes down to ￿0 thereafter. Hence KF
1 = ￿ K￿ (￿1) < KF
0 : Recall, however, that
the equilibrium is unstable. Hence the economy is spiralling up until KF
1 = ￿ K is




￿ (1 + ￿)
￿ ￿ K: We can draw therefore the following conclusion
Remark 1. If a policy move does not change the ratio of moneys of the farmer
and of the gatherer ￿; i.e. if the central bank changes the rates of growth of the
two monetary aggregates by the same amount, monetary policy is superneutral,
i.e. the allocation of land to the farmer and the gatherer does not change, real
variables are una⁄ected and the only e⁄ect of the policy move is an increase in the
rate of in￿ ation, which is pinned down to the (uniform) rate of change of money(s),
and of the nominal interest rate. If, on the other hand, the move is di⁄erentiated,
i.e. the central bank changes the rates of growth of the two monetary aggregates
by di⁄erent amounts so that the rates of growth are heterogeneous, monetary
policy is not superneutral, i.e. the allocation of land changes and real variables
are permanently a⁄ected, even if the rates of growth of the two aggregates go back
to the original value afterwards.
In the case of a linear technology and an unstable steady state, in the end the
economy converges to one of the polar cases. If the initial condition is in between,
we can easily conclude that such a move is welfare reducing, i.e. the economy
distances itself from the ￿rst best.










Let￿ s go back to the original dynamic system. An interesting way of computing
the steady state is the following. Rewriting the system ignoring time indices and

















￿ ￿ K ￿ KF￿￿























￿ ￿ K ￿ KF￿
KF










upon the relative value of ￿ and ￿:
In the case ￿ > ￿; the curve is downward sloping. In the opposite case, ￿ < ￿
the curve is upward sloping. In both cases, the curve and crosses the x-axis when
KF = h￿1 (￿￿).
The two curves can be interpreted as isoclines.
De￿ning KF
t ￿ = KF + _ KF where _ KF =
dKF
dt
is the time derivative of KF;
















￿ ￿ K ￿ K
F￿
(33)De￿ning qt ￿ = q + _ q where _ q =
dq
dt
is the time derivative of q; equation (17) can be
reformulated in continuous time as follows:
_ q = q ￿ g(K
F) (34)
We end up therefore with the dynamical system of two non linear di⁄erential
equations in the state variables K and q:
Let￿ s focus on (33) ￿rst. It is a ￿rst order non-linear di⁄erential equation in
K:









which is represented as an upward sloping of downward sloping (depending on















The steady state of the system can be found at the intersection of the two
isoclines.
It is unique if the curve is downward sloping, there are two steady states in
the opposite case.
For instance, in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function G
￿ ￿ K ￿ KF￿
= p
￿ K ￿ KF we can have two cases.
Case 1. gamma=0.5, R=1.1 (delta=0.1), sigma 1, alfa=0.5, Kbar=10









yCase 2. gamma=0.5, R=2.5 (delta=0.6), sigma 1, alfa=0.5, Kbar=10












A. Constraints at current and constant prices
In the following we denote magnitudes at current (constant) prices with capital
(small) letters.
We assume that each young farmer is endowed at birth with bequest AF
t . The
YF employs the bequest he got and credit Bt (since it turns out that he is a






￿and hold money balances MF
t;t.
Since the young does not derive utility from consumption, money is a reserve of
value for the YF: He carries money over from youth to old age in order to use it
as a means of payment in the latter stage of his life, i.e. to access consumption
when old.











t;t ￿ Bt + A
F
t (35)











t;t ￿ bt + a
F
t (36)








where it is the nominal interest rate. In words: The YF gets a loan in t greater




t . In real
terms: bt =
Qt+1
Pt (1 + i)
KF







where R := (1 + i)=(1 + ￿t+1) is the real (gross) interest rate and 1 + ￿t+1 :=
Pt+1=Pt is the (gross) rate of in￿ ation.
In t, the YF uses labour and land KF
t to produce output which will become
available in t+1, yF
t+1 = ￿KF
t :When old, the farmer has an "in￿ ow" equal to the
revenues from sale of output (produced when young) and money balances. Part of
the money balances are carried over from youth, part are conferred to the old by
the Government as a (monetized) transfer payment. 4The "out￿ ow" consists of
the repayment of the loan (if the YF were a borrower), consumption and bequest.














































where Tt+1 is a monetized transfer payment to the old agent. The transfer is proportional to



























t+1 = (￿ ￿ qt+1)KF
t + mF
t;t+1
where ￿t := qt ￿
qt+1
(1 + it)
(1 + ￿t+1) = qt ￿
qt+1
R
is the downpayment, i.e. the









t￿1provides a di⁄erent interpretation of the fof constraint:
the YF employs bequests and collateralizable wealth qtKF
t￿1 to put aside internal
￿nance and hold money balances.

















































When old, the gatherer employs "income", the repayment of the loan, money
carried out from youth and transfers to consume and leave a bequest. Therefore







t+1 + Bt (1 + it) + M
G
t;t+1

















+ Rbt + m
G
t;t+1
B. A di⁄erent trickling process
Money "trickles down" from one period to the next and from one agent to the
other. In order to describe a di⁄erent way by which money spreads in the economy,
let￿ s take a look at table 2. In each row we report the in￿ ows and out￿ ows which
show up in the FF constraints of the agents in period t+1. The amount in thein￿ ow cell is equal to the amount in the out￿ ow cell. For instance, the ￿rst row
represents the FF constraint of the YF in t+1. In this scenario, however, output
is available to the young, not to the old of the previous generation

























































In words: real money balances of the old agents is equal to the sum of aggregate
consumption and aggregate bequest.
























i.e. the total amount of bequest left by the old agents + total output is equal to










i.e the total amount of money of the young agents in t+1 must be equal to the
total amount of money of the old agents of generation t in t+1 as in the case of
section 5.
Thanks to the Cobb-Douglas speci￿cation of the utility function,from the








t+1 i = F;G (41)Moreover
a
F






























Total real money balances are proportional to aggregate output. Equation ... is
a sort of quantity theory of money in this context, even if formally di⁄erent from
the one obtained in section 6